THE VERACRUZ EXPEDITION OF 1847 BY K. JACK BAUER*
The failure of President James K. Polk to secure a negotiated peace with Mexico during the summer and fall of 1846 led to the November 17 decision in favor of an advance on Mexico City.' After canvassing possible invasion routes only one was found practicable: a landing at Veracruz followed by an advance overland to the Mexican capital.2 The projected expedition was not only the most ambitious military operation yet undertaken by the United States but also involved America's first large scale amphibious operation.
During the middle of the nineteenth century amphibious operations were still a terra incognita. No operational doctrine yet existed and special purpose landing craft were all but unknown. Nearly all previous landings had taken place in protected waters from ship's boats. Such protected waters did not exist around Veracruz.
Veracruz was considered by many to be the strongest fortified point in North America. A walled town of about 15,000 people, it lay on a sandy strip of coast about 450 miles south of the mouth of the Rio Grande. About half a mile offshore, in front of the town, Gallegos Reef broke the swell and formed a small but insecure harbor. On the inshore tip of the reef stood the massive fortress of San Juan de Ulloa commanding both the town and harbor.3 Veracruz lay in the midst of the yellow fever belt, forcing an invading army to seize Veracruz and Ulloa in time to move inland before the arrival of the disease season in late April or early May.
The command of this very ambitious and extremely difficult undertaking went to Ma. jor General Winfield Scott.4 Although he was without a doubt America's ablest and most distinguished soldier, his choice was not a congenial one to Polk who distrusted Scott as a professional soldier and as a Whig. But, no other general of suficient stature or ability was acceptable either.=' To Polk's credit, it must be said that once appointed he supported Scott fully.
Before leaving for the south Scott outlined Sess., pp. 1268 Sess., pp. -1269 Polk, Diary, II, 179-180, 195-197. 3Jos6 Maria Roa Barcena Rectterdos de la invasioni norteamericdna (3 vols.; Mexico City, 1940) He ordered 2500 of the men from Taylor's army to embark at the Brassos Santiago at the mouth of the Rio Grande and 5500 to embark at the newly captured port of Tampico."' The additional troops (newly raised volunteers) and material from the States were to proceed directly to Lobos."0 The troops at Brassos Santiago and Tampico were ready to embark by the last of January but a shortage of transports delayed their embarkation for nearly a month.12 The troops and material from the States were equally slow in arriving. When Scott reached Lobos on February 21, 1847, he found only parts of his five new volunteer regiments had arrived and when the bulk of the troops from the Brassos Santiago and Tampico arrived a week later he had less than 9,000 of his expected 14,000 men.13 Even more criti. cal was his shortage of ordnance and the absence of half his surfboats.14 These shortages were due to a number of reasons. Bad weather and a shortage of crews held up many of the transports for almost a month; ten transports were cancelled through a misunderstanding between Scott and the War Department; and some of the shortages ap. pear to have been caused by dilatory actions in Washington. Conner had the responsibility of assigning the vessels to carry Scott's force from Anton Lizardo to the anchorage off Sacrificios. He distributed Worth's brigade between the frigate Raritan, the screw sloop Princeton, and the army steamer Edith; Patterson's among the frigate Potomac and the army steamers Virginia and Alabama; and the reserve among the sloops of war Albany and St. Mary's, the brig Porpoise, the small steamer Petrita, and the army steamers Massachusetts and Eudora.29
The landings were set for March 8 but a falling barometer during the evening before caused Conner to postpone the landings for fear that a norther was approaching.30 As the norther did not appear he rescheduled the landings for the following day, March 9 -the thirtieth anniversary of General Scott's reaching flag rank.3' At daylight on the ninth the surfboats be. gan the ferrying of troops from their transports to the warships and steamers.32. Completing their mission about 10:00 A.M. the empty surfboats then made fast to the steamers for the tow to Sacrificios.33 At 9:45 the schooner-gunboats Reefer, Bonita, Petrel, Tampico, and Falcon of the inshore covering force hoisted anchor and stood up for the landing area.34 About an hour and three quarters later the remainder of the attack force, led by Conner in the Raritan and Scott in the Massachusetts, exited in single file through the narrow entrance to Anton Lizardo and stood north towards the landing 35 area.
The schooner-gunboats anchored off Collado Beach at about 12:15 P.M. and soon afterward the rest of the expedition began arriving.36 It was nearly 3 o'clock before the last of the vessels had taken its assigned place.3 At 3:30 the schooner-gunboats and the light draft steamers Spitfire and Vixen shifted their positions to form a line about ninety yards off the beach.38 At the same time Scott hoisted the signal to commence loading the surfboats.39 As the boats filled they attempted to form a line abreast of the Princeton, about 450 yards offshore, but the strong current setting in around Sacrificios threw the heavily laden boats into confusion. In an attempt to remedy the situation the Princeton at about four o'clock threw out a hawser to which the surfboats made fast.40 The surfboats were hopelessly confused and rather than delay the landings to reform his boats General Worth contented himself with arranging his regimental colors in the line of battle and instructing the surfboats to form on them when cast off for the land- The confusion among the surfboats took on a greater significance when the lookouts in the squadron reported a large cavalry patrol in the dunes behind the beach4 -a seemingly certain indication that the Mexicans would oppose the landings.
At 5:30 the Massachusetts fired a gun as the signal for the surfboats to cast off and pull for shore.43 After some confusion while the boats found their proper places the line swept in towards the sandy shore. As it neared the beach a gig pulled ahead on the left of the line, grounded on the beach, and a lone figure leaped out and waded ashore, his gold braid glistening in the sun. It was General Worth.44 Quickly the rest of the boats grounded and their passengers waded ashore. To the complete surprise of the Americans, the Mexicans fired not a shot. The first Americans to reach the top of the range of sand hills learned the reason. There were no Mexicans in sight; even the cavalry patrol had disappeared.
The reasons for General Juan Morales' failure to oppose the landing is difficult to understand. He had not been surprised and even a small force should have been able to make the landing very costly. Apparently Morales believed his poorly trained men could not stand up under a bombardment by naval guns and would be so demoralized by it that he would be unable to salvage a sufficient number to man the defenses of the city. Morales had barely enough troops to man his defenses and the loss of more than a very few would have made the defense of Veracruz extremely difficult if not impossible. Apparently also, Morales' strategy was to hold out as long as possible in the defenses of Veracruz in the hope that a relief force could fight its way through to him. Once the first wave had landed the surf boats returned to load Patterson's men. Since there had been no opposition no attempt was made to keep a line of battle, or even much order, as the surfboats shuttled back and forth individually, carrying the rest of Scott's men.46 The whole army of more than 8600 men was ashore without loss by midnight.47 Even today this would be no insignificant achievement, but in 1847 it was magnificent.
As soon as the army was ashore the landing of its supplies began.48 Conner rushed the landing of supplies because the appearance of a norther would seriously delay further unloading. Subsequently, a series of northers lasting from the twelfth to the seventeenth did seriously hamper the landing of supplies.49
Under cover of a brief diversionary bombardment of Ulloa by Commander Josiah Tattnall in the light draft steamer Spitfire Scott began his encirclement of Veracruz on the morning of March lo." Three days later it was complete.5' Scott's first siege batteries were ready by March 22. They opened fire the same day in conjunction with a bombardment of the town liv the IiAht draft steamers and gzunboats of the squadron.52 The absence of a large part of the army's siege train left Scott without sufficient heavy artillery to breach the walls of the town. To remedy this defect he requested the loan of some heavy guns from the navy. Commodore Matthew C. Perry, who had just relieved Commodore Conner, agreed provided the navy should man its guns. Scott concurred.53
The navy sent ashore six guns, three eight. inch shell guns and three thirty-two pounders.54 Emplaced in a battery laid out by Captain Robert E. Lee of Scott's staff, these first fired during the morning of March 24.5 After three days of action the navy's heavy guns had nearly breached the western wall of the town.56
With the bombardment beginning to show7 effect General Scott and Commodore Perry readied an assault which never occurred. General Morales called a council of war of his principal officers during the evening of the twenty-fifth. The council advised sur-render to save further bloodshed, 5 as the town and its inhabitants had suffered heavily from the pounding of the army's heavy mortars and howitzers. Morales opposed surrender and resigned his command to General Jose Juan Landero. The next day Landero opened the negotiations which led to the signing of Articles of Capitulation on March 27.58 To the pleasant surprise of the Americans, Landero included the Castle of San Juan de Ulloa in his surrender,59 thereby removing Scott's greatest obstacle. On March 29, a full month before the onset of the yellow fever season, the Americans marched into their prize.60
Even if Veracruz was not resolutely defended, and it was not, Scott's success should not be minimized. He conducted a well planned and well executed operation in spite of disheartening shortages of nearly everything except drive and resourcefulness on the part of the commanding general. He was ably assisted and supported by Commodore Conner whose relief during the siege was unfortunate and has robbed him of the recognition he deserves.
